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CASE COMMENTS
ourselves to be "law and order" exponents-constitutional guarantees
to the contrary notwithstanding.
DEBORAH MILLER
Zoning Ordinance-ENHANCEMENT OF AESTHETIC VALUES ALONE NOT
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER IN FLORIDA.-City Of
Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
William L. Wood stored his camper-type vehicle in his backyard.
After a neighbor complained to the police, Wood was issued a cita-
tion for violating a Coral Gables zoning ordinance. The ordinance pro-
vided that such vehicles, if kept on private property, must be stored
inside garages.' The trial court found Wood guilty and fined him $15.
On appeal to the circuit court, the judgment was reversed on the
grounds that the ordinance was "facially overbroad, unconstitutionally
vague and violative of the guarantees of the first, fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution."2 In reversing the cir-
cuit court, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that aesthetic
considerations have been held to be valid basis for zoning in Florida.3
The court added that "the Coral Gables ordinance is aimed at pre-
venting unsightly appearances and diminution of property values which
obtain when camper-type vehicles are parked or stored out of doors
in a residential area of the community." 4 Several authorities, including
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have an-
nounced that aesthetic considerations alone will support a zoning
73. 311 So. 2d at 111-12.
1. CORAL GABLES, FLA., CODE § 4.09(a) (1974), provides:
No House Car, Camp Car, Camper or House Trailer, nor any vehicle, or part of
vehicle, designed or adaptable for human habitation, by whatever name known,
whether such vehicle moves by its own power or by power supplied by separate
unit, shall be kept or parked on public or private property within the City,
except if enclosed within the confines of a garage, and unoccupied; or parked upon
a duly licensed or legally operating parking area, which is not a concomitant and
required under the zoning-or other-ordinance of the City.
2. 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773,
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ordinance in Florida. 5 As this case demonstrates, however, while Florida
courts have accepted aesthetics as partial justification for zoning, no
Florida court has upheld such an ordinance solely on aesthetic grounds.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance and set
limits on the states' police powers. The Court stated that it is within
the police power of the state to zone for the improvement of "public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. " 7 The Florida Supreme Court
has stated that while zoning ordinances are presumed valid, they also
must operate reasonably as applied to the factual situation in ques-
tion.8 It has further held that enforcement of an ordinance that
operates unreasonably, or is not within the limits of the police power,
constitutes a taking of property without due process of law.9
Despite the judicial solicitude toward zoning in general, there are
several reasons why courts have been reluctant in zoning cases to
accept aesthetics alone as sufficient justification for the exercise of the
police power. This reluctance stems primarily from the belief that
aesthetic considerations are not within the limits of the police power
as established in Euclid.10 Additionally, aesthetic standards employed in
drafting legislation as well as the standards used by courts have been
inexact if not indefinable. 1 Because of these imprecise guidelines, the
776 (1969); Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71
MicH. L. REv. 1438, 1440 (1973).
In Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit took
the position that aesthetics alone would sustain a zoning ordinance in Florida.
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. Id. at 395.
8. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941).
We will determine the reasonableness of the regulations as applied to the
factual situation meanwhile keeping before us the accepted rules that the court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council; that the ordinance is
presumed valid ... and that the legislative intent will be sustained if "fairly de-
batable."
Id. at 366. (citation omitted). Similar language can be found in decisions from many
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Baum v. City & County of Denver, 363 P.2d 688, 694 (Colo.
1961); State v. Diamond Motors, 429 P.2d 825, 829 (Hawaii 1967); Palazzola v. City of
Gulfport, 52 So. 2d 611, 613 (Miss. 1957).
9. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941).
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising
& Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267 (N.J. App. 1905).
Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of
necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power
to take private property without compensation.
Id. at 268; accord, City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842 (Ohio
1925).




opportunity for discriminatory enforcement is great.12 Finally, diversity
of taste is a major problem in zoning for aesthetics. Everyone has
different tastes and different concepts as to what is beautiful or
aesthetically appealing. 3 As one court noted, an "ordinance conforming
to the tastes and ideas of beauty passed by the body of lawmakers who
enact it might and probably would in most instances be distasteful
to the majority of the people of the city .... .14
Increasing development manifested the need to preserve the en-
vironment, and a few courts began to uphold zoning legislation pri-
marily intended to protect aesthetic values. They did so, however, on
traditional grounds. 15 Other courts took a more direct approach and
began to recognize aesthetic enhancement as part of the general welfare
concept and therefore as a legitimate justification for the exercise of
the police power. One court stated:
There is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development
which may be fostered within reasonable limitations .... Such legis-
lation is merely a liberalized application of the general welfare pur-
poses of state and federal Constitutions.16
Nevertheless, the vast majority of jurisdictions refused to accept
aesthetically-based legislation unless it could be justified on other tra-
ditional grounds, i.e., health, safety or morals.17
12. See, e.g., Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963), in which
an ordinance prohibiting signs advertising motel rates was held invalid as arbitrary and
discriminatory. Accord, Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach, 147 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). See also Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial
Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 177 (1970).
13. Several studies have been conducted to demonstrate that there can be general
agreement among the members of the public in aesthetics. See Note, Beyond the Eye
of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1438, 1442-47 (1973).
14. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 961 (Mo.
1911). See also Annot., 72 A.L.R. 465, 477-79 (1931).
15. See notes 17, 25, 28-31 and accompanying text infra for cases and the various
nonaesthetic grounds for upholding them.
16. Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99, 101 (Kan. 1923) (citation omitted). The
same year the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
If by term "aesthetic considerations" is meant a regard merely for outward
appearances, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the neighborhood itself,
we do not observe any substantial reason for saying that such a consideration is
not a matter of general welfare.
State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923).
17. A survey taken in 1969 showed that three jurisdictions had accepted zoning
based solely on aesthetics. Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46
J. URBAN L. 773, 776 (1969). By 1973, the number had apparently risen to 14 (different
standards were used in arriving at that figure, however). Note, Beyond the Eye of
the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 Mien. L. REV. 1438, 1440 (1973).
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For a number of years Florida followed a traditional approach
toward aesthetic zoning. The Supreme Court of Florida reflected a
typical sentiment in Anderson v. Shackelford.8
[T]o attempt to exercise the power of depriving one of the legitimate
use of his property merely because such use offends the aesthetic or
refined taste of other persons . . . cannot be exercised under the
Constitution, forbidding the taking of property for a public use with-
out compensation.19
Florida's increased dependence on tourism led to a re-evaluation
of the rigid stance taken in Anderson. In City of Miami Beach v.
Ocean & Inland Co., 20 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a zoning
ordinance and stated: "It is difficult to see how the success of Miami
Beach could continue if its aesthetic appeal were ignored because the
beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the winter traveler.' ' 2 1
Similarly, in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota,22 the court followed the
Ocean & Inland rationale and adopted the view of the lower court
that "aesthetic considerations could be just cause for regulating signs
in Sarasota inasmuch as the city was of the same character as Miami
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the United States Supreme Court upheld the
use of eminent domain in the District of Columbia to promote a more attractive com-
munity. The Court stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled. . . . If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted). Although Berman was decided in 1954, it has not been the
trendsetter in aesthetic zoning that it would appear to be. First, Berman was decided
under federal jurisdiction and dealt with the powers of eminent domain; state cases
deal with the exercise of the police power. Second, state courts scrutinize police power
legislation more closely under the fourteenth amendment than the Supreme Court
views the right to eminent domain under the fifth amendment, even though both
powers are weighed against due process considerations. Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics,
and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 85 (1964). As evidence of this fact,
the majority of states have either not accepted aesthetic zoning alone as sufficient
justification for exercise of the police power or have not yet addressed the issue in
their courts.
18. 76 So. 343 (Fla. 1917).
19. Id. at 345.
20. 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941).
21. Id. at 367. For the view that this case does not stand for the proposition that
aesthetics alone will justify the exercise of the police power, see Merritt v. Peters, 65
So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1953) (Barns, J., dissenting).
22. 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
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Beach .... ."23 Although the ordinances involved in these cases in-
creased the aesthetic appeal of the respective communities, the court
used an economic rationale focusing on maintenance of tourist revenue
as partial justification for the ordinance. Since these ordinances protect
tourism, they commensurately maintain economic prosperity and are
thus in the general welfare. 24
The vast majority of aesthetic zoning litigation in and out of Flori-
da has centered on several specific areas of regulation. While these
areas of regulation all deal with ordinances that affect aesthetics, they
have been upheld at least partly on economic grounds or traditional
grounds such as health and safety. The most important area involves
commercial signs. As Florida's tourist trade grew, tourist-oriented
businesses erected such a multitude of signs that the state's prominent
resort areas assumed an amusement park appearance. Responding to
this problem, the state, as well as its municipalities, enacted laws
regulating billboards and other signs. Most Florida aesthetic zoning
litigation has arisen in this area.15 Although these regulations have
generally been upheld, the decisions have been justified, to a large de-
gree, on nonaesthetic grounds. For example, in Hav-A-Tampa Cigar
Co. v. Johnson,26 a sign statute was upheld on safety grounds. The
court pointed out that signs located near the public highways distract-
ed the attention of drivers, thereby increasing the hazards of public
travel."
Another area in which litigation with an aesthetic impact has been
sustained for nonaesthetic reasons is architectural control. A large
number of municipalities have adopted ordinances which provide
that building plans be approved by an architectural review board
before a building permit is issued. The purpose of such review is to
minimize either excessive similarity or dissimilarity in a given neigh-
23. Id. at 614. Another case that follows the same rationale and is also cited in
Coral Gables is Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
24. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provided this explana-
tion in Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, (5th Cir. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963); Sunad, Inc.
v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla.
1957); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach, 147
So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Often the ordinance is upheld on purely safety grounds. See, e.g., Hav-A-Tampa Cigar
Co. v. Johnson, 5 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1941); John H. Swisher & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 5 So. 2d
441 (Fla. 1941); State ex rel. Boozer v. City of Miami, 193 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
26. 5 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1941).
27. Id.
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borhood.28 Although the purpose of architectural control is largely
aesthetic, courts and legislative bodies have consistently required that
the aesthetic incongruity of a proposed structure threaten surrounding
property values before architectural control can be invoked.2 9 Thus
courts rely on economics (maintenance of property values) to uphold
architectural control ordinances.
Finally, ordinances requiring minimum lot sizes and mandatory
setbacks have also been upheld for reasons other than aesthetics.3 0
For example, in Garvin v. Baker31 the Supreme Court of Florida up-
held a minimum lot size requirement, stating that,
[it is the duty of public authorities in municipalities to protect
the safety, the health and the general welfare of the citizens. This
duty involves sanitary and health regulations, the number of septic
tanks in a given area, sewerage disposal, the elimination of fire
hazards, and many other activities. The size of lots upon which a
one-family, two-family, or four-family, building may be erected is a
subject for police regulation and when not unreasonable, such regu-
28. Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L.
REv. 1438, 1454 (1973).
29. Although there are no Florida decisions that make this point, State ex rel.
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1955), is representative
of the decisions in other states. There a building inspector refused to issue a permit to
erect a house in a residential area because the proposed residence did not, in the
view of the village board, qualify under an ordinance that would not allow a house
to be built if the "exterior architectural appeal and functional plan" of the proposed
structure would be so at variance with the existing structures "as to cause a substantial
depreciation in the property values." Id. at 219.
See also Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963),
in which the plaintiff sought a building permit for a home that was of substantially
the same size and value as the surrounding homes. Because of its unorthodox architectural
design the board rejected the application for a permit because it did not qualify under
an ordinance which required that the proposed structure "maintain the high character
of community development .... ." 192 N.E.2d at 75. The court, however, would not
rest its decision solely on aesthetic grounds; instead, the board's decision was upheld be-
cause, inter alia, the proposed house would be likely to depreciate the value of the
adjacent lots. Id. at 77, 78.
One of the major problems that face the boards of architectural review is the
lack of definite and objective standards to guide the board members in their decisions.
In City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 30 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1947), the Florida
Supreme Court struck down a portion of an ordinance that required "the completed
appearance of every new building or structure must substantially equal that of the
adjacent buildings or structures . . . in appearance, square foot area and height."
Id. at 492. In striking the ordinance the court pointed out that the uncertainty of
the standards left the decision "to the whim or caprice of the administrative
agency .... " Id.
30. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U,S. 603 (1927); Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla.
1952).
31. 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
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lations do not deprive a person of his property without due process
of law.82
The Fifth Circuit stated in Stone v. City of Maitland,"s that Florida
has recognized enhancement of the aesthetic appeal of a community as
a proper basis for exercise of the police power.3 4 Though Florida
courts have upheld legislation which results in aesthetic enhancement,
this approval has been both limited to specialized areas of regulations
and based at least partially on nonaesthetic grounds.
When dealing with regulations involving commercial signs, mini-
mum lot size requirements, and mandatory set backs, courts have had
little problem in upholding the respective ordinances on traditional
grounds. A problem arises, however, in cases involving architectural
control and land use restrictions where there is no public health,
safety, or morals question. In sustaining these ordinances, courts must
rely on the general welfare basis for the police power which concept
appears to encompass economics. Courts have upheld architectural con-
trol ordinances when a proposed structure threatens to depreciate the
value of surrounding property. Furthermore, in resort cities such as
Miami Beach and Sarasota, aesthetic regulations have been sustained to
insure a constant flow of tourist revenue. Finally, like architectural
control ordinances, the Coral Gables ordinance at issue here was in
part upheld on the ground that it was "aimed at preventing . .
diminution of property values .... "3
These cases demonstrate that ordinances primarily aesthetic in
nature will be upheld. But contrary to the proclamation of the Fifth
Circuit and legal commentators, Florida's courts have not accepted
aesthetic considerations alone as a sufficient justification for the exercise
of the police power. To uphold an aesthetic-based ordinance that cannot
be sustained on health, safety, or morals grounds, it would appear
from case law that the ordinance must pass two tests: first, it must be
determined that the land use in question is unaesthetic and therefore
32. Id. at 364, 365.
33. 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
34. Id. Another specialized area of regulation which has emerged in other states
in recent years is the preservation of historic districts. The area is noteworthy in that,
unlike architectural control, it often can be based on well-defined architectural
standards. A leading case is Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass.
1955), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts approved an act establishing
an historic districts commission for the town of Nantucket. The stated purpose of the
act was to preserve the historical buildings, places and districts. While the court found
it necessary to mention the economic value of tourism, it principally relied on aesthetic
considerations, which were based on the historic character of a particular district with
very definite architectural chhracter,
35. 305 So. 2d 261, 263.
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worthy of regulation; second, the land use must cause economic harm
either to the community as a whole or at least to surrounding property
owners. If aesthetics alone were a valid basis for zoning, as has been
claimed, the second test would be unnecessary.
Although the Coral Gables decision was partially justified on
economics (maintenance of property values), the primary justification
was aesthetics. In fact the decision rests on a dubious economic assump-
tion-that a camper-type vehicle parked outside a resident's garage
results in a loss of value to surrounding property. This assumption
raises two questions: what land uses do in fact affect neighboring
property values, and how much diminution in land values is enough
to trigger the police power? The erection of a monstrous and un-
orthodox home in a neighborhood of colonial homes could con-
ceivably reduce the value of one of the adjacent houses. It is question-
able, however, whether a camper left in a homeowner's driveway, even
for an indefinite period of time, will have any effect on the value of
neighboring land. No proof was offered that a camper does in fact
have a detrimental effect on the value of surrounding property. There-
fore, the Coral Gables court seems to have sustained an aesthetic-
based ordinance, while paying only lip service to the question of
economic harm.
Since aesthetic grounds provide the only plausible support for the
Coral Gables decision, it would be tempting to report that the decision
marked the end of Florida's refusal to sustain zoning on an exclusively
aesthetic basis. Such a conclusion would be mistaken. The fact that
the Coral Gables court felt compelled to justify its decision on other
grounds indicates that the judges were not prepared to take that step.
Zoning draftsmen would still be well advised to write ordinances with
non-aesthetic grounds as support.
RICHARD BRYCE HADLOW
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